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THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL DISTRICT AS

"COMMUNITY" IN OBSCENITY CASES
Carl B. Rubin* and Gary Winters**
Few problems have plagued the courts in the last decade with
greater persistence than those associated with obscenity.
The concept of obscenity varies from place to place and from
time to time, and since it is essentially a subjective concept, it also
tends to vary from person to person. The development of a concept
of "community standard" recognizes that diverse viewpoints exist
and has resulted in the consideration by courts of the concept of
obscenity in light of a local standard rather than a national one. It
has also incidentally relieved the Supreme Court of the United
States from consideration of obscenity matters on a case-by-case
basis-an approach which has been neither practical nor possible
for that Court to adopt.
The community standard, however, merely shifts the burden of
inquiry. It is now the local trier of fact, either judge or jury, which
must consider this question in the light of local factors. While reducing the arena from a national to a local one may end the search for
a national standard and make the judicial problem manageable, it
may at the same time make the creative problem nearly impossible.
A film producer or an author or a painter must either bind himself
to the most restrictive local standard in order to avoid litigation or
be prepared to defend himself in the inumerable and ill-defined
"communities" that may each seek to determine the question of
obscenity.
The obvious solution is to define "community" in a manner
that will create a reasonably limited number of forums in which this
question may be litigated without returning to a "national standard."
This paper is limited to an examination of the community standard formulation announced by Miller v. Californiaand its compan2
ion cases' and further explained in Hamling v. United States and
Judge, United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, Western DiviB.A., University of Cincinnati, 1942; J.D., University of Cincinnati, 1944.
Dayton.
at
sion
** Gary Winters, Clerk, The Honorable Carl B. Rubin. B.A., University of Cincinnati,
1970; M.A., University of Cincinnati, 1972; J.D., University of Cincinnati, 1976.
1. Miller v. Calif., 413 U.S. 15 (1973); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49
(1973); Kaplan v. Calif., 413 U.S. 115 (1973); United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Super 8
MM. Film, 413 U.S. 123 (1973); United States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139 (1973). These cases will
be collectively referred to as Miller.
2. 418 U.S. 87 (1974).
*
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Jenkins v. Georgia.' Emphasis is placed upon the validity of denominating a federal judicial district a "community" for purposes of
determining such a standard,' and on the effect of such a determination upon subsequent state prosecutions.
I.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE COMMUNITY STANDARD

The concept of "contemporary community standards" was first
articulated by Judge Learned Hand in United States v. Kennerley5
Expressing his dissatisfaction with the then prevailing "most.susceptible person" test of Regina v. Hicklin, Judge Hand wrote:
Yet, if the time is not yet when men think innocent all that which is
honestly germane to a pure subject, however little it may mince its
words, still I scarcely think that they would forbid all which might
corrupt the most corruptible, or that society is prepared to accept for
its own limitations those which may perhaps be necessary to the
weakest of its members. If there be no abstract definition, such as I
have suggested, should not the word "obscene" be allowed to indicate
the present critical point in the compromise between candor and
shame at which the community may have arrived here and now? If
letters must, like other kinds of conduct, be subject to the social sense
of what is right, it would seem that a jury should in each case establish the standard much as they do in cases of negligence. To put
thought in leash to the average conscience of the time is perhaps
tolerable, but to fetter it by the necessities of the lowest and least
capable seems a fatal policy.

Nor is it an objection, I think, that such an interpretation gives
3. 418 U.S. 153 (1974).
4. This specific problem was presented to the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Ohio, Western Division at Dayton, in Cinema Associates, Ltd. v. City
of Oakwood, 417 F. Supp. 146 (S.D. Ohio 1976). In that case, pursuant to a criminal complaint, a copy of the motion picture being shown at defendant's theater, The Last Tango in
Paris, was seized. The film had been declared not obscene as a matter of law by Chief Judge
Timothy S. Hogan, United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, Western
Division at Cincinnati, in United Artists v. Leis, No. C-1-74-244 (S.D. Ohio, filed Jan. 23,
1975). Based on the analysis set out below, this author, sitting as trial judge, determined in
Cinema Associates that a federal judicial district is a community and that Judge Hogan's
holding in t nited Artists is binding within the Southern District of Ohio.
The artistic merit or lack thereof of The Last Tango in Pariswas not at issue in Cinema
Associates. Whether it appealed to a prurient interest or whether it possessed any socially
redeeming features was for a trier of fact..The only question was whether the issue could be
raised more than once in the same judicial district.
The definition of "community" properly should be made at a level higher than the
district court. However, Cinema Associates was not appealed. It remains then for another day
and another case to dispose of the issue, but until such time, Cinema Associates may be of
some assistance to other courts faced with the same problem.
5. 209 F. 119 (S.D.N.Y. 1913).
6. L.R. 3 Q.B. 360 (1868).
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to the words of the statute a varying meaning from time to time. Such
words as these do not embalm the precise morals of an age or place;
while they presuppose that some things will always be shocking to the
public taste, the vague subject-matter is left to the gradual development of general notions about what is decent. .... I

The Supreme Court adopted the Kennerley community standard rationale without elaboration as part of the fundamental obscenity test of Roth v. United States.' However, Roth did not define
the extent of the community; consequently there arose widespread
disagreement concerning its geographical boundaries. With the exception of the Fifth Circuit case, United States v. Groner,' nearly
'
all federal courts chose a national community. " State courts were
4
divided among national," statewide,' 2 local,'" and variable' communities.
Since the Supreme Court could not marshal an obscenity majority after Roth, the confusion was insoluable. The opinions of Jus5
tice Brennan and Chief Justice Warren in Jacobellis v. Ohio' are
indicative of the split in thinking in this area. Justice Brennan,
7. 209 F. at 121.
8. 354 U.S. 476 (1957). The inquiry is to be: "whether to the average person, applying
contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole
appeals to the prurient interest." 354 U.S. at 489.
9. 479 F.2d 577 (5th Cir.), vacated and remanded, 414 U.S. 969 (1973). The Supreme
Court ordered that the case was to be reconsidered in light of Miller. On remand the conviction was affirmed, 494 F.2d 499 (5th Cir. 1974).
10. See, e.g., United States v. Ginzburg, 383 U.S. 463 (1966), aff'd, 338 F.2d 12 (3d Cir.
1964), rehearing denied, 384 U.S. 934 (1966); Chemline, Inc. v. City of Grand Prairie, 364 F.2d
721 (5th Cir. 1966); United States v. Davis, 353 F.2d 614 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S.
953 (1966). See also cases cited in Comment, The Geography of Obscenity's "Contemporary
Community Standard," 8 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 81, 81-82 (1971).
11. See, e.g., State v. Childs, 252 Ore. 91, 447 P.2d 304 (1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S.
931 (1969); Hudson v. United States, 234 A.2d 903 (D.C. Ct. App. 1967); State v. Smith, 422
S.W.2d 50 (Mo. 1967), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 895 (1968); State v. Locks, 97 Ariz. 148, 397
P.2d 949 (1964); State v. Hudson City News Co., 41 N.J. 247, 196 A.2d 225 (1963).
12. See, e.g., Hunt v. State, 475 S.W.2d 935 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972); Court v. State,
51 Wisc. 2d 683, 188 N.W.2d 475 (1971), vacated and remanded, 413 U.S. 911 (1973) (for
further consideration in light of Miller), aff'd, 63 Wisc. 2d 570, 217 N.W.2d 676 (1974); People
v. Butler, 49 11. 2d 435, 275 N.E.2d 400 (1971).
13. See, e.g., Price v. Commonwealth, 213 Va. 113, 189 S.E.2d 324 (1972), vacated
and remanded, 413 U.S. 912 (1973) (for further consideration in light of Miller), aff'd, 214
Va. 490, 201 S.E.2d 798 (1974), rehearing denied, 414 U.S. 881 (1973); Jones v. City of
Birmingham, 45 Ala. App. 86, 224 So. 2d 922 (1969), cert. denied, 284 Ala. 731, 224 So. 2d
924 (1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1011 (1970).
14. See, e.g., In re Grannini, 69 Cal. 2d 563, 446 P.2d 535, 72 Cal. Rptr. 655 (1968)
(indicating that differing standards may be appropriate for "purely local" activity than for
nationally distributed material); City of Newark v. Humphres, 94 N.J. Super. 384, 228 A.2d
550 (Essex County Ct. 1967) (distinguishing between live performances and printed materials).
15. 378 U.S. 184 (1963).
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announcing the decision of the Court but writing only for himself
and Justice Goldberg, quoted at length from Kennerley" and then
stated:
It seems clear that in this passage Judge Hand was referring not to
state and local "communities," but rather to "the community" in the
sense of "society at large;. . . the public, or people in general." Thus,

he recognized that under his standard the concept of obscenity would

have a "varying meaning from time to time"-not from county to
county, or town to town.
We do not see how any "local" definition of the "community"
could properly be employed in delineating the area of expression that
is protected by the Federal Constitution. . . . It can hardly be assumed that all the patrons of a particular library, bookstand, or motion picture theater are residents of the smallest local "community"
that can be drawn around that establishment. Furthermore, to sustain the suppression of a particular book or film in one locality would
deter its dissemination in other localities where it might be held not
obscene, since sellers and exhibitors would be reluctant to risk criminal conviction in testing the variation between the two places. It
would be a hardy person who would sell a book or exhibit a film
anywhere in the land after this Court had sustained the judgment of
one "community" holding it to be outside the constitutional protection . ..
It is true that local communities throughout the land are in fact
diverse, and that in cases such as this one the Court is confronted
with the task of reconciling the rights of such communities with the
rights of individuals. Communities vary, however, in many respects
other than their toleration of alleged obscenity, and such variances
have never been considered to require or justify a varying standard
for application of the Federal Constitution. . . . It is, after all, a
national Constitution we are expounding."'
Chief Justice Warren, joined in dissent by Justice Clark, rejected
the contention that a national standard could be proved, or would
be appropriate even if proved.
It is my belief that when the Court said in Roth that obscenity is to
be defined by reference to "community standards," it meant community standards-not a national standard, as is sometimes argued.
I believe that there is no provable "national standard," and perhaps
there should be none. At all events, this Court has not been able to
enunciate one, and it would be unreasonable to expect local courts
to divine one. It is said that such a "community" approach may well
16.
17.

209 F. 119 (S.D.N.Y. 1913).
378 U.S. at 193-95.
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result in material being proscribed as obscene in one community but
not in another, and, in all probability, that is true. But communities
throughout the Nation are in fact diverse, and it must be remembered
that, in cases such as this one, the Court is confronted with the task
of reconciling conflicting rights of the diverse communities within our
society and of individuals."5

A corollary of the disagreement concerning choice of the appropriate community was the variation in proof required to demonstrate the standards of that community. Courts which chose national or statewide communities generally required expert or other
testimony to establish community standards. 9 Through such testimony, the prosecution had to establish a variance from the standard
or it failed to make its case. However, some jurisdictions permitted
determination based solely on an evaluation by the trier of fact of
the material or conduct in question.20 Courts selecting local communities, however defined, were inclined to defer to the trier of fact
as the "metaphysical embodiment"'" of the community and to consider such trier competent to decide the obscenity issue without
assistance.

22

Those courts which allowed, the trier of fact to proceed upon its
intuitive sense of contemporary community standards were on unsound ground in at least three respects. First, such an approach
operated to shift to the defendant the burden of introducing expert
evidence to prove lack of obscenity, rather than to maintain the
normal burden imposed by the Constitution upon the prosecution.
Second, it invited and encouraged the trier of fact to find obscene
such material or conduct which was personally repulsive or subjectively offensive.2" Third, and most important, it denied appellate
18. Id. at 200-01.
19. In re Grannini, 69 Cal. 2d 563, 446 P.2d 535, 72 Cal. Rptr. 655 (1968); Hudson v.
United States, 234 A.2d 903 (D.C. Ct. App. 1967); United States v. Klaw, 350 F.2d 155 (2d
Cir. 1965); State v. Hudson City News Co., 41 N.J. 247, 196 A.2d 225 (1963). The Grannini
court explained this requirement as: "relying principally on the well established doctrine that
jurors should not be endowed with the prerogative of imposing their own personal standards
as the test of criminality of conduct." 69 Cal. 2d at 574, 446 P.2d at 543, 72 Cal. Rptr. at
663.
20. People v. Butler, 49 I1. 2d 435, 275 N.E.2d 400 (1971); United States v. Wild, 422
F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 986 (1971), State v. Smith, 422 S.W.2d 50 (Mo.
1967), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 895 (1968); People v. Fitch, 13 N.Y.2d 119, 192 N.E.2d 713, 243
N.Y.S. 2d 1 (1963).
21. In re Grannini, 69 Cal. 2d at 576, 446 P.2d at 544, 72 Cal. Rptr. at 664.
22. United States v. Groner, 479 F.2d 577 (5th Cir.), vacated and remanded, 414 U.S.
969 (1973) (for further consideration in light of Miller), aff'd, 494 F.2d 499 (5th Cir. 1974);
Jones v. City of Birmingham, 45 Ala. App. 86, 224 So. 2d 922, cert. denied, 284 Ala. 731, 224
So. 2d 924 (1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1011 (1970); City of Newark v. Humphres, 94 N.J.
Super. 384, 228 A.2d 550 (Fssex County Ct. 1967).
23. In In re Grannini. 69 Cal. 2d at 574-75, 446 P.2d at 543, 72 Cal. Rptr. at 663, the
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courts any meaningful opportunity to review the propriety of evidence upon which an obscenity determination rested. Absent evidence in the record concerning standards to be applied, appellate
courts could not conduct the independent analysis needed for effective review.
Conversely, courts which demanded objective proof of some
standard were confronted with the practical difficulties of determining who was qualified to present the requisite evidence. 24 The problem was especially acute in those jurisdictions requiring a national
standard since, as Judge Jerome Frank stated, "[W]e do not know,
with anything that approximates reliability, the 'average' American
public opinion on the subject of obscenity."2" To the extent that
citizens of any state reflect the same diversity of opinion found
nationally, his statement applies with equal force to jurisdictions
which apply statewide standards.
II.

THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL DISTRICT AS "COMMUNITY"

After its decision in Roth v. United States,2" the Court found
itself unable to fashion a set of rules which commanded the support
of a majority of its members. Thereafter, the Court undertook, beginning with Redrup v. New York, 27 to decide obscenity cases on a
case-by-case basis in per curiam opinions which offered no explanation.
In Miller v. California21 the Supreme Court took the first steps
toward easing the burden of defining obscenity which it had borne
virtually alone since Roth. In its haste to be free of this responsibility, however, it neglected to provide the certainty and predictability
so needed in the law of obscenity. This neglect not only prevented
state and lower federal courts from assuming their share of the
burden of determining obscenity vel non, but also denied potential
defendants the opportunity to know with any degree of certainty
whether a contemplated action was or was not illegal.
court stated: "We cannot assume that jurors in themselves necessarily express or reflect
community standards: we must achieve so far as possible the application of an objective,
rather than a subjective, determination of community standards .... To sanction convictions without expert evidence of community standards encourages the jury to condemn as
obscene such conduct or material as is personally distasteful or offensive to the particular
juror."
24. See Note, The Use of Expert Testimony in Obscenity Litigation, 40 Wis. L. REv.
113 (1965); Comment, Expert Testimony in Obscenity Cases, 18 HASTINGS L.J. 161 (1966).
25. Roth v. Goldman, 172 F.2d 788, 796 (2d Cir. 1949).
26. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
27. 386 U.S. 767 (1967). The Court disposed of 31 cases in this manner. For a list of
them see Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 82-83 n.8 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
28. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
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The opinion in Miller had three important consequences. First,
it vested greater and essentially unreviewable discretion in the trier
of fact to define the community against whose standards the prurient interest and patent offensiveness of a work was to be measured." Second, it held that only descriptions or depictions of sexual
conduct specifically defined by state or federal law could be subject
to a finding of obscenity.30 Finally, it discarded the "utterly without
redeeming social value" test adopted by the plurality opinion in
"
Memoirs v. Massachusetts and limited the first amendment privilege to works which, taken as a whole, had serious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value.
Miller ended any speculation, at least in state obscenity cases,
that the community standard is to be determined with reference to
a national community.33 Quoting with approval from Chief Justice
34
Warren's dissent in Jacobellis, the majority explained:
Nothing in the First Amendment requires that a jury must consider
hypothetical and unascertainable "national standards" when attempting to determine whether certain materials are obscene as a
matter of fact. ...
It is neither realistic nor constitutionally sound to read the First
Amendment as requiring that the people of Maine or Mississippi
accept public depiction of conduct found tolerable in Las Vegas, or
New York City. [Citations omitted]. People in different States vary
in their tastes and attitudes, and this diversity is not to be strangled
by the absolutism of imposed uniformity.3
The Court did not, however, prescribe which of the alternative communities is to be the basis for the decision of the trier of fact. The
language of the opinion supported selection of either a statewide or
local community, but the Court gave no guidance as to its preference. In addition, the majority did not indicate whether the national
standard survived for purposes of obscenity actions in the federal
courts.
There was no similar lack of clarity in the Court's treatment of
the need for expert or other relevant testimony to establish the
community standard. Simply put, such testimony is not required.
The prosecution need only produce the challenged material or offer
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

413 U.S. at 31-34.
Id. at 24, 27.
383 U.S. 413 (1966).
413 U.S. at 24-25.
413 U.S. at 31.
378 U.S. at 200-01.
413 U.S. at 31-32.
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evidence of the conduct in question." The trier of fact may then
evaluate it in accordance with its prejudices free from any responsibility to predicate its finding upon objective proof in the record.
While the defendant may choose to introduce expert testimony to
support his position,3 7 it is clear that the trier of fact has no obligation to give any weight to such testimony.
The consequences discussed above in Part I therefore became
law as a result of the Court's decision. Further, though it discarded
the concept of national community, at least in state prosecutions,
the precise reach and meaning of its holding remained for further
explication.

One year later, in Jenkins v. Georgia3" and Hamling v. United

States," the Court took on the task of filling the holes in Miller.
Jenkins held that a state court trier of fact may, but is not required
to, apply the standards of a hypothetical statewide community in
lieu of the national standards rejected by Miller.4" Indeed, a state
need not specify any particular geographical community, and a trier
of fact need only be apprised of its duty to apply the standards of
an undefined "contemporary community."
Ham ling dispelled any wishful thinking that Miller reached
only state court cases. 4 Applying the reasoning of Jenkins, the
Court reaffirmed that a trier of fact
is entitled to draw on his own knowledge of the views of the average
person in the community or vicinage from which he comes for making
the required determination, just as he is entitled to draw on his
knowledge of the propensities of a "reasonable" person in other areas
of the law. 2
The Court found no merit in the claim that federal legislation requires a national standard of enforcement and observed no constitutional infirmity in subjecting federal defendants to the same variances in criminal liability suffered by state defendants." 3
The Ham ling opinion defined the community for federal obscenity prosecutions as the area from which the jurors are drawn;
36.

Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 56 (1973); Kaplan v. California, 413

U.S. 115, 121 (1973).
37.
38.

Cases cited note 36 supra.
418 U.S. 153 (1974).

39. 418 U.S. 87 (1974).
40. 418 U.S. at 157.
41. 418 U.S. at 104.
42. Id. at 104-05.
43 Id. at 106.
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44
i.e., the federal judicial district in which the case is tried. Although
at first blush this appears to impose upon federal triers of fact a
defined geographical community not similarly applied to restrict
state triers of fact, close examination reveals no substantial difference. The language of the opinion merely reiterates what theoretically occurs under Miller: triers of fact draw on their knowledge of
the community from which they are selected-be it local or state
community or federal judicial district-and the standards of that
community are thereby brought to bear upon the decision.
The effect of Miller.and its progeny has been to subject sexually
oriented material to an inarticulated and virtually unknowable
"crazy quilt" of varying community standards. Absent a controlling
state determination of the standard of obscenity, each county or
city prosecutor is free to proceed against the display of any sexual
material under any standard which he elects to utilize. Further, it
is conceivable and perhaps likely that contiguous counties or appellate districts will differ in their standards. Add to this the possibility
that the material may be challenged for a violation of a federal
statute in any division of the federal district courts, and the plight
of the distributor of the material becomes absurd." Multiply this
example by fifty states and ninety federal judicial districts, and its
consequences are reminiscent of "Alice's Adventures in Wonderland."
The ultimate outcome is that vendors and producers of sexually
explicit material will be exposed to the vagaries of conflicting intrajurisdictional and inter-jurisdictional standards. The risk of expensive and embarrassing law suits will likely result either in compelling regional or national distributors to gear their appeal to the
lowest common denominator of tolerance or in voluntarily restricting the distribution of their material to relatively "safe" communi44. The result of the Miller cases, therefore, as a matter of constitutional law and
federal statutory construction, is to permit a juror to draw on knowledge of the community or vicinage from which he comes in deciding what conclusion "the average
person, applying contemporary community standards" would reach in a given case.
Since this case was tried in the Southern District of California, and presumably jurors
from throughout that judicial district were available to serve on the panel which tried
petitioners, it would be the standards of that "community" upon which the jurors
would draw.
id. at 105-06.
45. Since 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a) (1970) permits federal obscenity prosecutions to be
brought in any federal judicial district throughout which allegedly obscene material passes
in transit, as well as where it is produced or distributed, prosecutorial forum shopping could
conceivably result in the finder of fact passing upon the legality of material which is not even
available in its community. The courts should invoke the transfer provisions of Rule 21(b),
FED. R. CrIM. P. to prevent such unjustifiable proceedings.
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ties. In either case, their first amendment rights will have been
"chilled" as effectively as by formal government censorship.
Inevitably, Miller's broad deterrent influence will inhibit production or
circulation of serious literary, artistic, or political works which include sexual elements."
Motion pictures are especially vulnerable to this type of censorship since they are extremely costly to produce and display, and
require extensive exhibition to be financially successful.4 7 Jenkins
itself reached the Supreme Court after the petitioner's conviction
for exhibiting the film, CarnalKnowledge, in Albany, Georgia, had
been affirmed by the Georgia courts. In spite of its wide critical
acclaim and the Academy Award winning performance of its leading
actress, the film was declared obscene in the community of Albany
and indeed, in the entire state of Georgia. That such a verdict could
be rendered, much less upheld, is indication enough of what lies
ahead. Unless the Supreme Court intends to conduct an independent review of every film found obscene in every community in the
nation-a most remote possibility given the intent and nature of
Miller-film makers will be constantly called upon to defend their
art but with little likelihood of success.
Under these circumstances, creative ideas which even peripherally involve sexual material will, regardless of merit, be left to
wither on the vine. In a sharp dissent from the Jenkins decision in
the Supreme Court of Georgia, Justice Guntner wrote:
My experience with this one case teaches me that the "alarm of
repression" was validly sounded [by Justice Brennan's dissent in
Paris Adult Theatre I]; . . .
If the motion picture "Carnal Knowledge" is not entitled to judicial protection under the First Amendment's umbrella, then future
productions in this art form utilizing a sexual theme are destined to
be obscenely soaked in the pornographic storm."
46. See N.Y. Times, Dec. 19, 1973, § 2, at 3, col. 6; id., Aug. 21, 1973, at 38, col. 1.
47. The film, The Last Tango in Paris, has been subjected to prosecution or threats of
prosecution in several jurisdictions. On at least five occasions, United Artists has responded
by seeking federal injunctive and declaratory relief or has challenged the constitutionality
of
the applicable statute. Success in the district courts has been mixed: United Artists v. Leis,
No. C-1-74-244 (S.D. Ohio, filed Jan. 23, 1975) (held not obscene as a matter of law); United
Artists v. Gladwell, 373 F. Supp. 247 (N.D. Ohio 1974) (injunction granted based on strong
probability that a hearing upon the merits would result in a finding of non-obscenity); United
Artists v. Wright, 368 F. Supp. 1034 (M.D. Ala. 1974) (prior restraint statute declared to
be
unconstitutional); United Artists v. Harris, 363 F. Supp. 857 (W.D. Okla. 1973) (three judge
court, relief denied); United Artists v. Proskin, 363 F. Supp. 406 (N.D.N.Y. 1973) (relief
denied pending New York Court of Appeals' construction of the statute).
48. 230 Ga. 726, 734-35, 199 S.E.2d 183, 188 (1973).
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Ironically, it may well be that the true pornographers and smut
merchants will actually profit, if not prosper from Miller. The publicity generated by a finding of obscenity in Omaha may contribute
to increased audiences in Los Angeles, and the low-budget nature
of these films permits them to reap sufficient returns without the
unrestricted national exhibition critical to legitimate cinema.
In terms of uniform and predictable application, the present
state of the law of obscenity is thoroughly deficient. Although recent
exists
verdicts in seemingly diverse communities indicate that there
49 unbriwidespread tolerance of even "hard core" sexual material,
dled discretion on the part of the trier of fact, with its potential for
arbitrariness and uncertainty, is a threat to first amendment freedoms. Miller requires that a finding of obscenity be predicated upon
both violation of the community standard and lack of serious value.
However, unless the trier of fact is sophisticated or extremely tolerant, it is likely that the distinction between these elements will be
ignored, and protected expression will be suppressed. The Supreme
Court has apparently decided that it is willing to accept such a risk
as the price of relieving itself of the "intractable obscenity problem." ' " Perhaps, as with Jenkins, the Court will rejoin the fray to
correct obvious abuses of the first amendment, but it clearly has not
committed itself to this course, and would seem to prefer to avoid
it.
III.

EFFECT OF THE "FEDERAL JUDICIAL DISTRICT COMMUNITY" ON
SUBSEQUENT STATE PROSECUTIONS

In Miller and subsequent cases the Court did not have occasion
to address the perplexing questions of federal jurisdiction and
federal-state comity which its holdings created. Those cases reached
the Court after criminal trials by jury, and the decisions reflect that
posture. Hamling, while indicating that a federal judicial district is
the proper "community" for purposes of federal obscenity prosecutions,"' does not reach the situation where a party threatened with
state prosecution seeks injunctive or declaratory relief in the federal
district court. Nor does it reach the more intriguing question of
49. See cases cited in Pines, The Obscenity Quagmire, 49 CAL. ST. B.J. 509, 561 (1974),
involving Deep Throat, Behind the Green Door, and Devil in Miss Jones.
50. Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 704 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring
and dissenting).
51. 418 U.S. at 105-06. See United States v. Marks, 520 F.2d 913 (6th Cir. 1975) for an
explicit acceptance of a federal judicial district as a community; and United States v. Various
Articles of Obscene Merchandise, 363 F. Supp. 165 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) for an implicit acceptance. See also United States v. Groner, 479 F.2d 577, 583 (5th Cir. 1973) for a pre-Miller
statement to the same effect.
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whether a district court's holding that a particular item is not obscene in a city or county within the district thereby forecloses challenge to that item in state courts within the district.
Considerations of equity and comity preclude federal courts
from issuing declaratory judgments concerning matters pending in
state criminal proceedings."2 Similarly, unless there is bad faith
enforcement of state laws or danger of great and immediate irreparable harm, federal courts may not enjoin pending state criminal
proceedings. 53 Such considerations, however, are no obstacle to the
grant of federal declaratory relief when state prosecution is threatened but not yet initiated. 4 All that is necessary in the latter instance is a sufficient actual controversy to meet the constitutional
requirement of a "case or controversy."
If the federal judicial district is a community for purposes of
adjudicating obscenity questions, as Hamling suggests, then material deemed protected in one instance should be immune from all
subsequent attacks within the district. Were it otherwise, material
would be subjected to various standards within a single community,
a result arguably not contemplated by the Miller Court. The issue
has not been directly before the Supreme Court, 55 and among past
and present members of the Court there has been substantial disagreement concerning the res judicata and stare decisis effects of
declaratory judgments upon state courts and prosecutors. Since, as
a practical matter, establishing the federal judicial district as a
community is significant only if the jurisdiction of the district court
exists and its decrees have some binding or precedential value, it is
necessary to examine the law in this area.
A.

The Res JudicataEffect
Concurring in Steffel v. Thompson," Justice White anticipated
that a holding of immunity from prosecution on constitutional
grounds would be accorded res judicata effect in any later prosecu-

52. Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 72-73 (1971).
53. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 48-49 (1971).
54. Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 462-63 (1974). The Court did not reach the
question of injunctive relief, but arguably it would be available if the traditional equity
requirements are met. Stefel involved threats of criminal trespass prosecution for distribution of anti-war leaflets on private property.
55. The traditional rule, which is probably no longer valid, is stated at 46 AM. JuR. 2d
Judgments § 620 (1969) as:
A judgment of a civil court is not binding upon a court in which a criminal case is being
tried, and a judgment rendered in a civil action is not admissible in a subsequent
criminal prosecution where the judgment is offered for the purpose of proving facts
adjudicated thereby, although exactly the same questions are in dispute in both cases.
56. 415 U.S. 452 (1974).
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tion of the same conduct and suggested that there may be additional
undefined circumstances in which the judgment should be considered "more than a mere precedent bearing on the issue before the
state court." 7 He also disagreed with the proposition that a federal
court, having rendered a declaratory judgment, is powerless to enjoin a later state prosecution contrary to the federal declaration.',
White's conclusions are supported by dictum in the Court's opinion
in Samuels v. Mackell. '9 There Justice Black wrote that, since the
Declaratory Judgment Act'" provides for post-judgment enforcement by the district court of its order, declaratory judgments might
serve as the basis for subsequent injunctions to "protect or effectuate""' the declaration. Moreover, he continued, the declaratory
relief alone had "virtually the same practical impact as a formal
injunction would." 2 This rationale is consistent with the legislative
intent behind the Act 3 and with the constitutional prohibition
against advisory opinions.
Conversely, Justice Rehnquist, joined in concurrence by Chief
Justice Burger in Steffely viewed federal declaratory judgments as
6
having only persuasive influence on state prosecutors, and disputed the availability of injunctions to enforce compliance with
such declarations.67 Rehnquist expressly declined to discuss the res
judicata effect of declaratory judgments, but offered the opinion
that their stare decisis effects would be less influential in state
courts than in ensuing proceedings within the same federal jurisdiction."
It appears that White and Black have the better of this argument, if for no other reason than that Rehnquist's approach would
reduce declaratory judgments in this context to mere exercises in
futility and render the Declaratory Judgment Act an instrument of
doubtful constitutionality. 9 In addition, Rehnquist's opinion evi57. Id. at 477.
58. Id.
59. 401 U.S. at 72.
60. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2801-02 (1970).
61. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1970).
62. 401 U.S. at 72.
63. 415 U.S. at 466-68.
64. See Note, Community Standards, Class Actions, and Obscenity Under Miller v.
California, 88 HARV. L. REv. 1838, 1865-66, for an expanded explanation of this point.
65. 415 U.S. at 478.
66. Id. at 482.
67. Id. at 480-81.
68. Id. at 482 n.3.
69. Cf. Note, The Res Judicata Effect of Declaratory Relief in the Federal Courts, 46
S. CAL. L. REV. 803 (1973).
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dences a misunderstanding of the congressional purpose in providing an effective alternative to injunctive relief.7
Taking the approach advocated by White and Black, however,
does not in itself provide a definite answer to the question posed at
the inception of this section." Assuming that a declaratory judgment has res judicata effect, it will normally operate to bar or collaterally estop relitigation of the determined issue only by those who
had been parties to the declaratory suit.7 2 Even in jurisdictions

which permit a defendant to invoke the conclusive effect of a judgment rendered in a suit to which he was not party, the plaintiff must
have been party to the prior suit. Thus, under the orthodox concept of res judicata and collateral estoppel, only the potential prosecutor and defendant in an obscenity action will be bound by the
declaration. Even in more liberal jurisdictions, the prosecutor
against whom res judicata is asserted by a "stranger" in a subsequent action, must have been the potential prosecutor in the declaratory suit.
Typically, however, the requirements of the res judicata doctrine will not be met in obscenity cases. It is much more likely that
in cases arising after a declaratory judgment that a piece of material
is not obscene, the defendant but not the prosecutor will have been
a party to the declaratory suit,74 or neither will have been parties to
such suit.75 Nevertheless, in both of these situations the material
will not differ from that which was the subject of the declaratory
action. Arguably, extending the res judicata doctrine to estop prosecutions under these circumstances can be justified as merely avoiding repetitious attempts by the state to "convict" the material itself
rather than its vendors. The state will not be deprived of the opportunity to present its case since presumably it will have been argued
to the utmost by the prosecutor appearing in the declaratory action.7" However such an interpretation of the doctrine would radically depart from present practice, and would be criticized as contrary to the spirit of Younger v. Harris."
70.
71.
72.

415 U.S. at 465-68.
See p. 31-32 supra.
Lawlor v. National Screen Service Corp., 349 U.S. 322 (1955). See generally F.
JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE, § 11.23 (1965).
73. Zdanok v. Glidden, 327 F.2d 944 (2d Cir. 1964).
74. E.g., the same film distributor, but accused in another county.
75. E.g., the film exhibitor rather than the distributor is accused and in another county.
76. See Bernhard v. Bank of America National Saving and Trust Ass'n, 19 Cal. 2d 807,
122 P.2d 892 (1942).
77. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
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Despite the questionable applicability of the res judicata doctrine to the situation where neither the accused nor the prosecutor
was a party to the declaratory suit, there exist two other theories
under which the declaratory judgment may be raised to defend
against or halt state prosecution.
B.

The Stare Decisis Effect

As noted above, White's opinion in Steffel speaks cryptically of
circumstances in which a declaratory judgment ought to be regarded as having more than "mere" precedential influence upon the
issue before a state court."8 Presumably, he intended this statement
to rebut Rehnquist's blanket assertion that the stare decisis effect
of a federal declaration is less marked in state courts than in subsequent proceedings within the same federal district." As a general
statement of the effect of stare decisis Rehnquist's conclusion is
correct, but is perhaps conservatively stated. Professor Moore states
unequivocally: "While a decision of a federal court, other than the
Supreme Court, may be persuasive in a state court on a federal
matter, it is, nevertheless not binding, since the state court owes
80
obedience to only one federal court, namely the Supreme Court."
Declaratory judgments involving questions of statutory unconstitutionality are the ideal vehicles for a departure from a given
traditional rule. In the case of a facially invalid statute or of conduct
which cannot be constitutionally proscribed under any statute,
there is no policy to be served by permitting state prosecution
within the district after a federal court has determined unconstitutionality. Likewise, if a statute is voided as applied to a particular
prospective defendant, all those similarly situated should be protected from prosecution. This latter case, however, will involve
questions of fact not present in the former, and may require presentation of evidence in the state tribunal.
In the instance of a declaration that particular material is not
obscene, the reliance upon stare decisis is simpler still. If the federal
court has declared the statute per se unconstitutional, or has found
the challenged material constitutionally protected, further prosecutions, either under the void statute or of the particular material, will
serve no legitimate state interest. Because the material that is the
subject of legal challenge will be unchanged, prosecution under a
statute declared unconstitutional as applied will be as pointless as
78.
79.
80.

415 U.S. at 477.
Id. at 482 n.3.
1 B. J. MOORE, FEDERAL
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a prosecution under a facially invalid statute. Further, since obscenity statutes are generally cut from a common mold, even prosecutions under different statutes or ordinances will not necessarily escape the reach of the declaratory judgment. In the latter instance,
however, an evidentiary hearing may be necessary to determine the
applicability of the federal declaration.
Giving declaratory judgments this additional measure of stare
decisis effect would contribute much needed certainty, both to constitutionally based declaratory judgments in general, and to obscenity declarations in particular. This extension is limited and reasonable. However as with the res judicata changes proposed above, it
represents a substantial modification of traditional concepts of the
federal-state court relationship. As such, it will be decried as inconsistent with the policies of comity and federalism and ennunciated
in Younger."
C.

The Younger Effect
A final approach is suggested by Younger itself. The Younger
exception for bad faith enforcement of state laws" provides the
means by which a defendant may obtain federal injunctive relief
from state prosecutions in an obscenity case. In this situation the
focus shifts from prosecutions contrary to a federal declaratory judgment that a given piece of material is not obscene to the relief
available to convicted parties.
Younger held that pending state prosecutions may not be enjoined by the federal courts unless the proceedings have been undertaken in bad faith.13 An obscenity prosecution contrary to a federal
declaration would seem to be precisely this sort of proceeding. In the
words of the Supreme Court in Dombrowski v. Pfister, it is not
begun "with any expectation of securing valid convictions." 4 This
is so because any conviction resulting from such prosecution, even
should it not be reversed upon state appellate review, surely will not
survive a habeas corpus petition filed in the district court which
issued the declaratory judgment. The futility of the state's effort
removes any justification based on its legitimate law enforcement
interest in the prosecution.
This Younger alternative is also not without it disadvantages.
Unlike res judicata and stare decisis it is a direct federal interfer81.
82.
83.
84.

401 U.S. at 43-45.
Id. at 48-49.
Id.
380 U.S. 479, 482 (1965), quoted in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. at 48.

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol2/iss1/5

19771

FEDERAL DISTRICT AS COMMUNITY

ence with state judicial processes. Also, it requires a separate proceeding in the federal court rather than presentation of an affirmative defense in the state court. Justice Rehnquist, in Steffel, foresaw
the attempt to avoid Younger in this manner, and expressed his
opinion
that continued belief in the constitutionality of the statute by state
prosecutorial officials would not commonly be indicative of bad faith
and that such allegations, in the absence of highly unusual circumstances, would not justify a federal court's departure from the general
principles of restraint discussed in Younger.5
Rehnquist's objection aside, this approach is apparently now
available to federal courts. Ironically, of the three routes discussed
above it is the one most disruptive of state proceedings and the least
easily implemented. Clearly, some application of res judicata or
state decisis is preferable to a federal injunction. The comparatively
minor intrusion which results from giving federal declaratory judgments res judicata or stare decisis effect is more consistent with the
principles of Younger and with the constitutional and practical necessity of according declaratory judgments a measure of finality.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Certain factual peculiarities cast doubt upon the reliability of
the Ham ling precedent. Hamling involved an unusually small judicial district"6 consisting of only one division, a single seat of court,
and only two counties. It is open to question whether the Supreme
Court would have found a community to exist in a district of multiple divisions each consisting of numerous counties ranging from
rural to highly urban, and perhaps further subdivided into several
seats of court.8 7 The presumption that triers of fact are drawn from
and represent the entire district would not be valid in this situation,
and this would appear to fatally undermine the Court's rationale."8
Further, applying the Harling rule to the twenty-six federal judi85. 415 U.S. at 483-84.
86. 28 U.S.C. § 84(d) (1970).
87. For example, the Southern District of Ohio encompasses 48 counties, some nearly
200 miles apart, and has permanent seats of court in three cities. 28 U.S.C. § 115(b) (1970).
It includes four large cities as well as sparsely populated farming and mining areas.
88. 418 U.S. at i05, 106. See note 44 supra for a quotation from the opinion setting forth
this rationale. This concept of community is also supported by the declaration of national
policy in the Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968, 28 U.S.C. § 1861 (1972). That section
states that:
It is the policy of the United States that all litigants in Federal Courts entitled to trial
by jury shall have the right to grand and petit juries selected at random from a fair
cross section of the community in the district or division wherein the court convenes.
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cial districts which consist of an entire state"5 opens the possibility
that a federal court could completely preclude any state court consideration of a particular piece of material simply by the federal
court's declaration that the material was not obscene. This result
does not comport with Miller, and it seriously violates the policy of
federal-state comity.
The problem of defining the concept of community has no definitive solution and there will be none until the Supreme Court is
presented with and chooses to hear a case developing this issue.
Until that time the federal courts must apply the law of Hamling
and must do so in all circumstances where the concept of "community" is critical. Thus, when issuing a declaratory judgment of
non-obscenity, a district court should explicitly state that its
order binds the entire district "community." State prosecutors will
thereby be on notice that proceedings adverse to the declaration
may either be subject to the assertion of a defense of res judicata or
stare decisis or may be enjoined by the district court as within the
bad faith exception to Younger.
Admittedly this procedure is less than ideal, but until the Supreme Court sees fit to provide additional guidance in this sensitive
area of first amendment freedoms, federal courts have a responsibility to contribute greater certainty and predictability to the law in
this area. The prescription outlined above advocates the subordination of jurisdictional orthodoxy to the overriding need to protect first
amendment rights.
89. See, e.g.. 28 U.S.C. §§ 82, 85, 86, 87, 91 (1970). In addition to these 26 states, the
District of Columbia and Puerto Rico each constitute a judicial district. 28 U.S.C. §§ 88, 119
(1970).
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